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[L. A. No. 24629. In Bank. Nov. 5, 1957.]

WILLIAM (BILL) ATKINSON et at, Petitioners, v. THE
SUPERIOR COURT OF LOS ANGELES COUNTY, ReIpondent; AMERICAN FEDERATION OF MUSICIANS et aI., Real Parties in Interest.
[L. A. No. 24630. In Bank. Nov. 5,1951.]

JOHN H. ANDERSON, JR., et a1., Petitioners, v. THE SUPERIOR COURT OF LOS ANGELES COUNTY, ReIpondent; AMERICAN FEDERATION OF MUSICIANS et at, Real Parties in Interest.

/J

[1] lIlandamus-To Oourts.-Mandamus is an appropriate remedy
to compel the superior court to assume jurisdiction over petitioners' application for preliminary injunction and· appointment of a receiver, unless an appeal from an order denying the
motion for preliminary injunction constitutes a plain, speedy
and adequate remedy. (Code Civ. Proc., § 10B6.)
[2] Id.-Jlearing in Supreme Oourt.-Where no purpose but delay would be served by reviewing a decision of the District
Court of Appeal in a mandamus proceeding that the remedy
by appeal was inadequate, the Supreme Court, OD granting
petitions for hearing by the real parties in interest, may accept such decision for the purposes of the proceedings before

it.
[3] Process-Service on Nonresidents.-Personal service outside
the state on a nonresident trustee of a fund set up by a resi[8] See Oal.Jur., Process, Notices and Papers, 125; Am.Jur.,
Process, § 78 et seq.
McX. Dig. References: [1] Mandamus, §144, 65; [2] Mandamus,
§ 111; [8,7J Process, § 33; [4,5, B, 9] Conflict of Laws, §lB; [6]
Judgments, § 1(2); [10J United States Courts, § 3.
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dent union is sufficient to give the superior court jurisdiction
to adjudicate his right to receive payments under collective
bargaining contracts which members of the union claim should
be paid to them rather than the trustee.
[4] Oon4ict of Laws - Personal Property - Sltus.-Employers'
obligation to make certain payments under collective bargaining contracts with a union is a chose in action and is personal
property within the meaning of Code Civ. Proe., § 17, suM. 3;
being an intangible it has no situs in fact.
[6] Id.-Personal Property-Situs.-An intangible, unlike real or
tangible personal property, has no physical characteristics that
would serve as a basis for assigning it to a particular locality;
the location assigned to it depends on what action is to be
taken with reference to it.
(6] Judgments-On Oonstructive Service.-Code Civ. Proe., § 417,
permitting a personal judgment on service by publication over
a person outside the state only if he was personally served
with a copy of the summons and complaint and was a resident
of the state at the time of the commencement of the action
or at the time of service, precludes the entry of a personal
judgment against a trustee who was served outside the state
but who is not and has not been a resident of the state.
[7] Process-Service on Nonresidents.---'"There is no distinction be·
tween jurisdiction to take over a nonresident's claim to a chose
in action admittedly his and jurisdiction to establish that it
was never his; in both situations the nonresident can protect
his interest in the property only by submitting to the juris.
diction of the court.
[8] Con4ict of Laws-Personal Properly-Intangibles.-In the
case of intangibles, jurisdiction must be determined in the light
of the totality of contacts with the state involved.
[Da, 9b] Id. - Personal Property - Intangibles. - In actions by
members of a resident union against the union, a nonresident
trustee of a fund set up by the union, and the respective em·
ployers, where an obligation owed by the employers under
collective bargaining agreements which plaintiffs sought to
enforce grew out of their employment in this state, and where '.
it was alleged that their right to payments wider such agreements to be consideration for work performed in this state and
that diversion of such payments to the trust would be violative
of their rights, fairness to plaintiffs demanded that they be
able to reach the fruits of their labors before they were removed from the state, and fairness to those defendants, who
were personally ~fore the court, demanded that the conflicting

[4] See oal.Jnr.fd, Con1lict of Laws, § 42; Am.Jv., Con1lict of
Laws, § 65 et seq.
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claims of the trustee be subject to final adjudication, and the
multiple contacts within this state sustained the jurisdiction of
the superior court to exercise quasi itt rem jurisdiction over
the intangibles in question.
[10] United Sta.tes Oourta-Oo~current Jurisdiction of Federal and
Sta.te Oourts.-A remedy that a federal court may provide
without violating due process of law does not become unfair
or unjust because it is sought in a state court instead.

PROCEEDINGS in mandamus to compel the Superior Court
of Los Angeles County to assume and exercise jurisdiction
with respect to applications for preliminary injunction and
appointment of receiver. Writ granted.
John W. Preston, Harold A. Fendler and Daniel A. Weber
for Petitioners.
No appearance for Respondent.
Bodkin, Breslin & Luddy, Henry Kaiser, Emanuel L.
Gordon, Michael G. Luddy, O'Melveny & Myers, Homer I.
Mitchell, Charles G. Bakaly. Jr., Mitchell, Silberberg & Knupp,
Guy Knupp, Loeb & Loeb, Alfred I. Rothman and Averill C.
Pasarow for Real Parties in Interest.
TRAYNOR, J .-Separate class actions were brought by two
groups of musicians attacking the validity of collective bargaining contracts between their employers and the American
Federation of Musicians and certain trust agreements related
thereto. One action is on behalf of the employees of various
motion picture companies and the other is on behalf of the
employees of various phonograph record companies. The gist
of plaintiffs' complaints is that in violation of its duty as
their collective bargaining agent and in fraud of their rights
the federation contracted with the employers that certain
royalty payments and payments for reuse of motion pictures
on television should be paid to a trustee for specified trust
purposes instead of to the employees.
Plaintiffs allege that these payments constitute wages earned
by the employees and that their diversion to the trust is
violative of their rights; that the purpose of the trust is to
contribute to the public knowledge and appreciation of music
throughout the U~ited States and Canada, and the trustee
is authorized and,directed to expend the trust funds in presenting personal performances by instrumental musicians. to

.J
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which the public is admitted without charge; that the trust
arrangement diverts wages earned by California employees,
members of Local Number 47, for the benefit of federation
members elsewhere without corresponding benefit to plaintiffs
from the operation of similar arrangements made elsewhere j
that the employers are willing to make the payments to their
employees, but for their agreements with the federation to
make the payments to the trustee; and that the national executive officers of the federation insisted on this arrangement
for the selfish purpose of perpetuating themselves in office
and of maintaining their hold and control over the affairs of
the federation and used the trust fund to win the support
of officials of the federation's locals and member musicians
throughout the United States and Canada, who vastly outnumber plaintiffs and are not employed by the employers here
involved.
In each action, the federation, the trustee, and the respective
employers are named as defendants. Plaintiffs seek a declaration of the invalidity of the collective bargaining agreement
and their right to the payments either as beneficiaries of a
constructive trust or on the ground that the payments constitute wages withheld in violation of sections 222 and 224
of the Labor Code. They also seek damages against the
federation for breach of its duty to them. At the commencement of the actions they moved for the appointment of a receiver to collect the payments and preliminary injunctions to
prevent the employers from making the payments to the
trustee. The employers have been personally served with
process in this state, and personal jurisdiction has been obtained over the federation. The trustee was served pursuant
to court order by delivery of summonses and complaints and
motion papers within the State of New York, but he has not
appeared.
The trial court held that insofar as plaintiffs sought to
intercept the delivery of payments to the trustee by the appointment of a receiver and temporary injunctions, the trustee
was an indispensable party and that the court had no jurisdiction to grant plaintiffs' motions for provisional relief
without personal jurisdiction over the trustee. It was careful to point out that its ruling was based solely on lack of
jurisdiction and stated that "if the court had jurisdiction
to do so, the exerciiSe of a sound discretion would probRbly
require the granting of a preliminary injunction and perhaps
the appointment of a receiver.••• "
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Some of the plaintiffs in each of the actions then filed their
petitions for writs of mandate in the District Court of Ap·
peal, Second Appellate District. The Second Division of that
court issued alternative writs of mandate and after a hearing filed its decision in each case "commanding respondent
superior court to assume and exercise jurisdiction over petitioners' application for preliminary injunction and appointment of receiver as prayed herein." Petitions for hearing by
the real parties in interest, the defendant employers and
federation, were then granted by this court~
[1] The writ of mandate is an appropriate remedy unless
an appeal from each order denying the motion for a preliminary injunction constitutes" a plain, speedy, and adequate
remedy." (Code Civ. Proc., § 1086; Financial lndem. Co. v.
Superior Court, 45 Ca1.2d 395, 399 [289 P.2d 233J.) [2] Peti·
tioners alleged in their petitions before the District Court
that the remedy by appeal was not adequate because of thE'
necessity of prompt action to prevent further movement of
funds out of the jurisdiction of the superior court. Since no
purpose but delay would be served at this time by reviewing
the District Court's decision that the remedy by appeal was
inadequate, we accept it for the purposes of these proceedings.
(Bowles v. Superior Court, 44 Ca1.2d 574, 582 [283 P.2d 7041.)
[3] We have concluded that personal service upon the
trustee in New York was sufficient to give the court jurisdiction to adjudicate his right to receive payments under the
contracts here involved. Code of Civil Procedure, section
412, provides: "Where the person on whom service is to be
made resides out of the State . . . and it . . . appears . . .
that it is an action which relates to or the subject of which is
real or personal property in this State, in which such person
defendant . . . has or claims a lien or interest, actual or contingent, therein, or in which the relief demanded consist
wholly or in part in excluding such person . . . from any interest therein, such court, or judge, may make an order that
the service be made by the pUblication of the summons."
Section 413 provides that personal service outside the state
is equivalent to publication. [4] Plaintiffs claim that the
employers' obligation to make the payments involved is one
owing to them instead of to the trustee. That obligation is a
chose in action and is therefore personal property within the
meaning of the stat'litory provisions. (Code Civ. Proc., § 17.
subd. 3.) Being an intangible, it has no situs in fact.
[5] " An intangible, unlike real or tangible personal property,

Nov. 1957]

ATKINSON V. SUPERIOR COURT

343

143 C.2d 338; 316 P.2d 960 J

)

has no physical characteristics that would serve as a basis for
assigning it to a particular locality. The location assigned
to it depends on what action is to be taken with reference to
it." (Estate of Waits, 23 Ca1.2d 676, 680 [146 P.2d 5].) The
question presented, therefore, is whether the chose in action
in question may be treated as being within this state within
the meaning of section 412 for purposes of exercising in rem
or quasi in rem jurisdiction over it in these actions.
Plaintiffs rely on cases holding that having jurisdiction over
the obligor, the state has po\ver to enforce the obligation and
cut off the right, if any, of a nonresident claimant thereto
without personal jurisdiction over the nonresident. Garnishment proceedings (Ha1-ris v. Balk, 198 U.S. 215 [25 S.Ct. 625,
49 L.Ed. 1023]) and escheat proceedings (Standard Oil 00.
v. New Jersey. 341 U.S. 428 [71 8. Ct. 822, 95 L.Ed. 1078] ;
Security Sav. Bank v. California, 263 U.S. 282 (44 S.Ct. 108,
68 L.Ed. 301, 31 A.L.R. 391]) are examples of the exercise
of such power. Defendants contend, however, that in the
case of ordinary choses in action such power is limited to
situations in which the local claimant admits the validity of
the local debtor's obligation to the nonresident and seeks to
reach the interest he admits is the property of the nonresident.
They point out that in the present case plaintiffs are not
seeking to reach property admittedly belonging to the trustee
but are claiming that the obligation is owed only to them.
Defendants rely on cases holding that the debtor cannot treat
his own obligation as property where he is, when his purpose
is to terminate a nonresident's claim against him (Vanderb'ilt
v. Vanderbilt, 354 U.S. 416 [77 S.Ct. 1360, 1 L.Ed.2d 1456] ;
Estin v. Estin, 334 U.S. 541 [68 S.Ct. 1213, 92 L.Ed. 1561,
1 A.L.R.2d 1412]), and they contend that the rule is the same
when the debtor seeks to interplead both a local and a nonresident claimant. (New York Life Ins. 00. v. Dunlevy, 241
U.S. 518 [36 S.Ct. 613, 60 L.Ed. 1140].) In their view it is
immaterial in an action to adjudicate conflicting claims to an
obligation, whether the action is commenced by the obligor,
where only one of the claimants can be served, or is commenced by one of the claimants, where he can secure personal
jurisdiction over the obligor but not over the rival claimant.
We find no controlling precedent of the United States Supreme Court. It is true that in the Dunlevy case creditors
of one of the s:laimants to the insurance proceeds had garnisheed Mrs. Dunlevy's interest before the insurance company
sought to interplead the local claimants with Mrs. Dunlevy
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who was absent, but the court was careful to point out that
the interpleader action "initiated by the company was an
altogether different matter" from the garnishment proceedings and that under the applicable state law a judgment
exonerating the garnishee was not binding on the absent
debtor whose claim against the garnishee the local creditors
had unsuccessfully attempted to reach. (241 U.S. 518, 520521.) Defendants rely on language in Bank of Jasper v. First
Nat. Bank, 258 U.S. 112, 118-119 [42 S.Ct. 202, 66 L.Ed. 490],
suggesting a distinction for jurisdictional purposes between an
action to reach a debt owed an absent defendant and an action
seeking to establish that the debt is owed directly to the plaintiff instead of to the absent claimant. In the Bank of Jasper
case, however, the obligation had been embodied in a negotiable certificate of deposit that was not within the jurisdiction of the court, and the Supreme Court summarized its
holding by stating that" As neither the certificates of deposit
nor the holder thereof were within the State of Florida, its
courts could not-in the absence of consent-acquire jurisdiction to determine the liability of maker to holder." Accordingly, that case is not controlling here where the obligation
has not been embodied in a negotiable docum~nt.
Decisions of other courts involving conflicting claims to
choses in action, where the action has been commenced by one
claimant who has secured personal jurisdiction over the debtor
but not over the absent claimant, are in conflict as to whether
there is jurisdiction to adjudicate the absent claimant's rights.
(See, e.g., sustaining or indicating jurisdiction: Cameron v.
Penn Mut. Life Ins. Co., 111 N.J. Eq. 24 [161 A. 55,60] ; 116
N.J. Eq. 311 [173 A. 344, 346] ; Ely v. Hartford Life Ins. Co.,
128 Ky. 799 [110 S.W. 265, 268] ; State ex reI. Richardson v.
MueUer, 230 Mo.App. 962 [90 S.W.2d 171, 174-176]; Omaha
Nat. Bank v. Federal Reserve Bank, 26 F.2d 884, 887-889;
Feucktwanger v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 288 N.Y.
342 [43 N.E.2d 434, 435] ; First Nat. Bank v. Bank of Horatio,
161 Ark. 259 [255 S.W. 881, 882]; Taylor v. Security Mut.
Life Ins. Co., 38 Misc. 575 [77 N.Y.S. 1012, 1013] ; Oishei v.
Pennsylvania R. Co., 117 App.Div. 110 [102 N.Y.S. 368, 371],
aff'd, 191 N.Y. 544 [85 N.E. 1113] ; Morgan v. Mutual Benefit
Life Ins. Co., 189 N.Y. 447 [82 N.E. 438, 441] ; Kumor v. Scottish Union & Nat,Ins. Co., 47 Wyo. 174 [33 P.2d 916, 920922] ; Bush v. MiSsouri State Life Ins. Co., 86 Okla. 182 [207
P. 317, 319J; Mutual Home Assn. v. Zwatchka, (Tex. Civ.
App.) 297 S.W. 317, 318; Perry v. Young, 133 Tenn. 522
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[182 S.W. 577, 578, L.R.A. 1917B 385] j Shef"m(Jln Nat. Bank
v. Shubert Theatrical Co., 238 F. 225, 229; Morgan v. Mutual
etc. I"",. Co., 16 Cal.App. 85, 90-93 [116 P. 385]. Denying
or indicating no jurisdiction: Mahr v. Norwich Union Fire
1"",. Soc., 127 N.Y. 452, 460-462 [28 N.E. 391} j Kelly v. Norwich Union Fire Ins. Co., 82 Iowa 137 [47 N.W. 986, 987] j
Royal Neighbors of America v. Fletcher, 99 Okla. 297 [227
P. 426, 429] ; Cross v. Armstrong, 44 Ohio 613 [10 N.E. 160,
164-166] ; Washington Life Ins. Co. v. Goodling, 19 Tex.Civ.
App.490 [49 S.W. 123, 127]; Redzina v. Provident 1M. for
Savings, 96 N.J.Eq. 346 [125 A. 133, 136] ; McBride v. OMland, 89 N.J.Eq. 314 [104 A. 435, 436]; Austin v. Royal
League, 316 Ill. 188 [147 N.E. 106, 109] ; Schoenhols v. New
York Life I"",. Co., 197 App.Div. 91 [188 N.Y.S. 596] ; Eisner
v. Williams, 298 Mich. 215 [298 N.W. 507, 509-510] ; Stockbridge v. Phoenix Mut. Life Ins. Co., 193 F. 558, 560.)
In the absence of a settled rule governing the situation before us, and in light of the fact that an intangible may be
subjected to the jurisdiction of the court without personal
jurisdiction over all of the parties involved for some purposes but not for others, we eonclude that the solution must
be sought in the general prineiples governing j.urisdiction
over persons and property rather than in an attempt to
assign a fictional situs to intangibles.
It is significant that with respeet to jurisdietion to tax
intangibles (Curry v. McCanless, 307 U.S. 357, 373-374 [59
S.Ct. 900, 83 L.Ed. 1339, 123 A.L.R. 162]), jurisdiction over
foreign corporations (International Shoe Co. v. Washington,
326 U.S. 310, 316 [66 S.Ct. 154, 90 L.Ed. 95, 161 A.L.R. 1057] ;
Perkins v. Booguet Mw.. Co., 342 U.S. 437, 445 [72 s.et. 413,
96 L.Ed. 485]), and jurisdiction to adjudicate trust obligations (Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank ~ Trust Co., 339
U.S. 306, 311-313 [70 S.Ct. 652, 94 L.Ed. 865]), emphasis is
no longer placed on actual or physical presenee but on the
bearing that local eontacts have to the question of over-all
fair play and substantial justice. A similar ehange in emphasis has been taking place with respect to personal jurisdiction over individuals. (Cf., Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714
[24 L.Ed. 565]; with Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 462463 [61 S.Ct. 339, 85 L.Ed. 278, 132 A.L.R. 1357] ; Hess v.
Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352.[47 S.Ct. 632,71 L.Ed. 1091] ; Allen
v. Superior Court, 41 Ca1.2d 306, 310-313 [259 P.2d 905];
.'" rlgrJn v. Miller, 11 !Il.2d 378 r143 N.E.2d 673] ; see Smyth
v. Twin State Imp. Corp., 116 Vt. 569 [80 A.2d 664, 25 A.L.R.

'
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2d 1193}.) "But now that the capias ad respondendum has
giyen way to personal service of summons or other form of
notice, due process require,s only that in order to subject a
defendant to a judgment in personam, if he be not present
within the territory of the forum, he have certain minimum
contacts with it such that the maintenance of the suit does
not offend I traditional notions of fair play and substantial
justice.' I t (International Shoe Co. v. Washington, supra,
326 U.S. 310, 316.)
[6] In the present case, since the trustee is.·not and has not
been a resident of California, section 417 of the Code of Civil
Procedure precludes the entry of a personal judgment against
him, and it is therefore unneces.'.ary to determine whether· his
activities as trustee have sufficient connection with this state
constitutionally to justify an assumption of personal jurisdiction without service of process here. The relevant contacts
with this state are significant, however, in deciding whether
due process permits exercising a more limited or quasi in rem
jurisdiction to determine his and plaintiffs' interests in the
intangibles in question.
[7] We find no relevance in the distincti()n defendants
seek to make between jurisdiction to take over a nonresident's
claim to a chose in action admittedly his and jurisdiction to
establish that it was never his. In both situations the nonresident can protect his interest in the property only by
submitting to the jurisdiction of the court. It is true that in
the former situation he must litigate a controversy solely
between himself and his creditor unrelated to preexisting
rights in the obligation garnished, whereas in the latter situation preexisting conflicting rights to the obligation itself are
involved; but this distinction alone has no bearing on the
fairness of making him appear. It has been rejected in a case
involving both real and personal property including intangibles (Loaiza v. Superior COIl,rt, 85 Cal. 11, 34·35 [24 P.
707, 20 Am.St.Rep. 197, 9 L.R.A. 376]), and does not exist
with respect to controversies over corporate stock. (Jellenik
v. Huron Copper Min. Co., 177 U.S. I, 12-13 [20 S.Ot. 559,
44 L.Ed. 647] ; Wait v. Kern River Min. etc. Co., 157 Cal. 16.
21 [106 P. 98] ; Amparo Min. Co. v. Fidelity Trust Co., 75
N.J.Eq. 555 [73 A. 249, 250.251]; Michigan Trust Co. v.
Probasco, 29 Ind.App. 109 [63 N.E. 255, 251].) It is true
that for some P'll'poses the state of incorporation may
be peculiarly appropriate for the purpose of litigating conflicting claims to corporate stock, but if so, it is because of
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relevant contacts there; if such contacts exist elsewhere,
jurisdiction also follows. (lV ait v. Kern River Min. etc. Co .•
supra, 157 Cal. 16, 21.) [8] Similarly, in the case of other in·
tangibles, jurisdiction must be determined in the light of the
totality of contacts with the state involved. Indeed, many of
the apparently conflicting decisions on the question before us
could be reconciled on their facts, if not their language, on
this basis. (C/., e.g., Omaha Nat. Bank v. Federal Reserve
Bank, 26 F.2d 884, 887·889; Feuchtwanger v. Central Hanover
Bank ct Trust Co., 288 N.Y. 342 [43 N.E.2d 434. 435] ; First
Nat. Bank v. Bank 0/ Horatio, 161 Ark. 259 [255 S.W. 881,
882] ; Morgan v. Mutual Benefit Li/e 1m. Co., 189 N.Y. 447
[82 N.E. 438. 440·441] ; Kumor v. Scottish Union ct Nat. Ins.
Co., 47 Wyo. 174 [33 P.2d 916, 920·922) ; Perry v. Young, 133
Tenn. 522 [182 S.W. 577,578] ; with Mahr v. Norwich Union
Fire Ins. Soc., 127 N.Y. 452, 460·462; Cross v. Armstrong, 44
Ohio 613 [10 N.E. 160, 164] ; Eisner v. Williams, 298 Mich.
215 [298 N.W. 507, 509·510].)
[9a] The present case is not one in which an obligor has
invoked the jurisdiction of a court remote from the obligee
solely for the purpose of terminating his obligation (see
Estin v. Estin, supra; Vanderbilt v. Vanderbut, supra) or
sought to compel conflicting claimants to adjudicate their
rights in a forum of his own choice. (See New York Li/e 1m.
Co. v. Dunlevy, supra.) The obligation plaintiffs seek to en·
force grows out of their employment by defendants here. The
payments involved are alleged to be consideration for work
performed in this state. The federation defendant is before
the court. Under these circumstances, fairness to plaintiffs
demands that they be able to reach the fruits of their labors
before they are removed from the state. Moreover, fairness
to the defendants who are personally before the court also
demands that the conflicting claims of the trustee be subject
. to final adjudication. Even if we were to hold that his absence
prevents the granting of the provisional remedies here sought,
plaintiffs would not be foreclosed thereby from asserting that
payment to him did not discharge the employers' obligation
to them and that the federation was independently liable for
damages for breach of its fiduciary duty. The evil of ex·
posing the obligor to actions to enforce the same obligation
in two jurisdictions with the attendant risk of double liability would not 'be obviated. It was just such double liability that was sustained in the Dunlevy case anl~ gave impetus to the passage of federal interpleader legislation. (See

I,
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Chafee, Interstate Interpleader, 33 Yale L.J. 685, 711.) It is
doubtful whether today the United States Supreme Court
would deny to a state court the interstate interpl0ader jurisdiction that federal courts may exercise. [10] A remedy
that a federal court may provide without violating due
process of law does not become unfair or unjust because it is
sought in a state court instead. To sustain jurisdiction in
these cases, however, we are not required to forecast the overruling of the Dunlevy case and to act on that basis. [9b] For
the reasons stated above, this case is clearly distinguishable
from the Dunlevy case, and the multiple contacts with this
state fully sustain the jurisdiction of the superior court to
exercise quasi in rem jurisdiction over the intangibles in question.
Let the writ of mandate issue in each case commanding
respondent superior court to assume and exercise jurisdiction
over petitioners' application for a preliminary injunction and
the appointment of a receiver as prayed herein.
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Carter, J., Schauer, J., Spence, J., .
and McComb, J., concurred.

